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NIST Special Publication 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture
Scott publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207
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NIST Special Publication 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture
Scott Network Technologies Division Information Technology Laboratory

Stu2Labs Stafford, VA
Sean & Infrastructure Security Agency Department of Homeland Security
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207
August 2020
U.S. Department of Commerce
Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

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National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-207 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-207, 59 pages (August 2020) CODEN: NSPUE2
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207
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NIST SP 800-207 ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE
Reports on Computer Systems Technology
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nations measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITLs responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITLs research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.
Zero trust (ZT) is the term for an evolving set of cybersecurity paradigms that move defenses from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. A zero trust architecture (ZTA) uses zero trust principles to plan industrial and enterprise infrastructure and workflows. Zero trust assumes there is no implicit trust granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location (i.e., local area networks versus the internet) or based on asset ownership (enterprise or personally owned). Authentication and authorization (both subject and device) are discrete functions performed before a session to an enterprise resource is established. Zero trust is a response to enterprise network trends that include remote users, bring your own device (BYOD), and cloud-based assets that are not located within an enterprise- owned network boundary. Zero trust focuses on protecting resources (assets, services, workflows, network accounts, etc.), not network segments, as the network location is no longer seen as the prime component to the security posture of the resource. This document contains an abstract definition of zero trust architecture (ZTA) and gives general deployment models and use cases where zero trust could improve an enterprises overall information technology security posture.
architecture; cybersecurity; enterprise; network security; zero trust.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207

NIST SP 800-207
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Acknowledgments
This document is the product of a collaboration between multiple federal agencies and is overseen by the Federal CIO Council. The architecture subgroup is responsible for development of this document, but there are specific individuals who deserve recognition. These include, project manager of the Federal CIO Council ZTA project;, project manager for the NIST/National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence ZTA effort; and.
This document is intended to describe zero trust for enterprise security architects. It is meant to aid understanding of zero trust for civilian unclassified systems and provide a road map to migrate and deploy zero trust security concepts to an enterprise environment. Agency cybersecurity managers, network administrators, and managers may also gain insight into zero trust and ZTA from this document. It is not intended to be a single deployment plan for ZTA as an enterprise will have unique business use cases and data assets that require safeguards. Starting with a solid understanding of the organizations business and data will result in a strong approach to zero trust.
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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 History of Zero Trust Efforts Related to Federal Agencies 2
1.2 Structure of This Document . 2
2 Zero Trust Basics 4
2.1 Tenets of Zero Trust 6
2.2 A Zero Trust View of a Network . 8
3 Logical Components of Zero Trust Architecture. 9
3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture Approaches . 11
3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity Governance . 11
3.1.2 ZTA Using Micro-Segmentation 12
3.1.3 ZTA Using Network Infrastructure and Software Defined Perimeters. 12
3.2 Deployed Variations of the Abstract Architecture 13
3.2.1 Device Agent/Gateway-Based Deployment. 13
3.2.2 Enclave-Based Deployment 14
3.2.3 Resource Portal-Based Deployment .. 15
3.2.4 Device Application Sandboxing . 16
3.3 Trust Algorithm. 17
3.3.1 Trust Algorithm Variations 19 3.4 Network/Environment Components .. 21 3.4.1 Network Requirements to Support ZTA. 21
4 Deployment Scenarios/Use Cases 23
4.1 Enterprise with Satellite Facilities 23
4.2 Multi-cloud/Cloud-to-Cloud Enterprise . 24
4.3 Enterprise with Contracted Services and/or Nonemployee Access .. 25
4.4 Collaboration Across Enterprise Boundaries 26
4.5 Enterprise with Public- or Customer-Facing Services .. 27
5 Threats Associated with Zero Trust Architecture 28
5.1 Subversion of ZTA Decision Process 28
5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network Disruption . 28
5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider Threat .. 29
5.4 Visibility on the Network.. 29
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207

NIST SP 800-207 ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE
5.5 Storage of System and Network Information 30
5.6 Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats or Solutions .. 30
5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA Administration .. 30
6 Zero Trust Architecture and Possible Interactions with Existing Federal Guidance . 32
6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management Framework . 32
6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy Framework 32
6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Architecture 33
6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0 33
6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS National Cybersecurity Protection System) 34
6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) Program 34
6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data Strategy 35
7 Migrating to a Zero Trust Architecture 36
7.1 Pure Zero Trust Architecture. 36
7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based Architecture 36
7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected Network.. 37
7.3.1 Identify Actors on the Enterprise .. 38
7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the Enterprise.. 38
7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing
Process 39
7.3.4 Formulating Policies for the ZTA Candidate 39
7.3.5 Identifying Candidate Solutions . 40
7.3.6 Initial Deployment and Monitoring 40
7.3.7 Expanding the ZTA.. 41
References . 42
List of Appendices
Appendix A Acronyms .. 45 Appendix B Identified Gaps in the Current State-of-the-Art in ZTA .. 46
B.1 Technology Survey 46
B.2 Gaps that Prevent an Immediate Move to ZTA 47 B.2.1 LackofCommonTermsforZTADesign,Planning,andProcurement47
B.2.2 PerceptionthatZTAConflictswithExistingFederalCybersecurity
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207

NIST SP 800-207 ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE
Policies. 47 Systemic Gaps that Impact ZTA . 47 B.3.3 StandardizationofInterfacesBetweenComponents..47 B.3.4 EmergingStandardsthatAddressOverrelianceonProprietaryAPIs.48 Knowledge Gaps in ZTA and Future Areas of Research 48 B.4.5 AttackerResponsetoZTA..49 B.4.6 UserExperienceinaZTAEnvironment49 B.4.7 ResilienceofZTAtoEnterpriseandNetworkDisruption..49 References 50
List of Figures
Figure 10: Enterprise with Nonemployee Access . 25 Figure 11: Cross-Enterprise Collaboration .. 26 Figure 12: ZTA Deployment Cycle .. 37
Zero Trust Access .. 5 Core Zero Trust Logical Components .. 9 Device Agent/Gateway Model 14 Enclave Gateway Model .. 15 Resource Portal Model.. 16 Application Sandboxes.. 17 Trust Algorithm Input .. 18 Enterprise with Remote Employees 24 Multi-cloud Use Case . 24
List of Tables
Table B-1: Summary of Identified Deployment Gaps . 46
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207

1 Introduction
NIST SP 800-207 ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE
A typical enterprises infrastructure has grown increasingly complex. A single enterprise may operate several internal networks, remote offices with their own local infrastructure, remote and/or mobile individuals, and cloud services. This complexity has outstripped legacy methods of perimeter-based network security as there is no single, easily identified perimeter for the enterprise. Perimeter-based network security has also been shown to be insufficient since once attackers breach the perimeter, further lateral movement is unhindered.
This complex enterprise has led to the development of a new model for cybersecurity known as zero trust (ZT). A ZT approach is primarily focused on data and service protection but can and should be expanded to include all enterprise assets (devices, infrastructure components, applications, virtual and cloud components) and subjects (end users, applications and other non- human entities that request information from resources). Throughout this document, subject will be used unless the section relates directly to a human end user in which user will be specifically used instead of the more generic subject. Zero trust security models assume that an attacker is present in the environment and that an enterprise-owned environment is no differentor no more trustworthythan any nonenterprise-owned environment. In this new paradigm, an enterprise must assume no implicit trust and continually analyze and evaluate the risks to its assets and business functions and then enact protections to mitigate these risks. In zero trust, these protections usually involve minimizing access to resources (such as data and compute resources and appl

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